Gol commanded the operation on the Khalkhin River. Tank battles at Khalkhin Gol

In Mongolia, on the Khalkhin Gol River, starting in the spring and ending in the fall of 1939, there were battles between Japan and Japan. In the spring of 1939, the Japanese government sent numerous troops to Mongolian territory in order to ensure the creation of a new border between Mongolia and Manchukuo, so that the new border strip would run along the Khalkhin Gol River. Soviet troops were sent to help friendly Mongolia and, uniting with Mongolian military units, prepared to repel the aggressor. After the invasion of Mongolian soil, the Japanese immediately met powerful resistance from Soviet troops and by the end of May were forced to retreat to Chinese territory.
The next attack by Japanese troops was more prepared and massive. Heavy equipment, guns and planes were sent to the border, and the number of soldiers already numbered about 40 thousand people. The strategic goal of the Japanese was to defeat the Soviet troops on the Khalkhin Gol River, which he commanded, and to occupy important heights and bridgeheads for future offensives. The Soviet-Mongolian group was almost three times inferior to the Japanese troops, but bravely entered into battle with enemy forces. Having first achieved strategic results and captured Mount Bain-Tsagan on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, the Japanese intended to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops, but during stubborn fighting for three days, they were defeated and were forced to retreat again.
But the Japanese army did not calm down and in August began to prepare a new, even more powerful offensive, bringing additional reserves to Khalkhin Gol. The Soviet troops were also actively strengthening, about 500 tanks appeared, a fighter brigade, a large number of guns and the number of personnel was already almost 60 thousand soldiers. G.K. Zhukov was appointed corps commander and prepared to launch a counterattack against Japanese formations, carefully camouflaging himself and spreading false information that Soviet troops would only be ready to attack by winter. And Japanese troops planned to launch another attack at the end of August.
But the Soviet troops, unexpectedly for the enemy, unleashed all their power on August 20 and, having pushed the Japanese 12 km, brought in tank troops and entrenched themselves at important heights. The central, southern and northern groups of Soviet-Mongolian troops, as planned, pinned down the enemy with constant attacks and by August 23, they captured the main Japanese forces in a tight ring. And by the end of August, the Japanese were fragmented into small units and completely destroyed.
As early as half of September, the Japanese invaders tried to take revenge, breaking through Khalkhin Gol several times both by land and by air, but the skillful actions of the Soviet troops constantly forced them to retreat, suffering heavy losses. Ultimately, the aggressive Japanese government was forced to conclude a peace treaty with the Soviet Union, which was signed on September 15.
Victory in this conflict was very important for the USSR, security guarantees appeared in the east of the country, and in the future it was because of this battle that the Japanese did not dare to help the Germans in the war against the Soviet Union.

March 29th, 2012

The international situation in the pre-war period was characterized, on the one hand, by acute imperialist contradictions within the countries of the capitalist world, and on the other, by their general hostility towards the Land of the Soviets, the world's first socialist state. Imperialism sought to resolve these contradictions through military, violent means.

Moreover, the main trend in the policy of the most aggressive states - Germany and Japan - was the desire to combine efforts to attack the USSR from two sides, and to impose a war on two fronts on the Soviet Union. This trend intensified even more and acquired a certain direction in connection with the conclusion of the “Anti-Comintern Pact” in 1936 and the formation of a military-political bloc of fascist states, which included Germany, Italy and Japan. The creation of such a military-political coalition with the distribution of spheres of action of its participants was aimed at inciting hotbeds of war in Europe and Asia. In 1938, the Nazi army captured Austria, occupied Czechoslovakia, and in April 1939, Hitler approved the Weiss plan, which provided for an attack on Poland before September 1, 1939.

The famous Stalinist Industrialization was actually an act of the Cold War of those years to urgently create modern weapons in response to open military preparations of neighbors. Now it is pointedly ignored that Soviet Russia was considered a weak adversary and a tasty morsel for the aggressor. Even Finland openly made plans for dividing the territory of the USSR, holding relevant discussions in parliament.

But this was far from just a cold war; Soviet Russia waged a real “hot” defensive war almost throughout the 30s; the real war began long before 1941. The prominent Japanese historian I. Hata claims that on the Soviet-Chinese border only 1933-34 There were 152 clashes between Japanese and Soviet troops, in 1935 - 136 and in 1936 - 2031. The Japanese were always the attacking party.

In the East, the Japanese army invaded China, occupied the entire territory of Manchuria, creating here the puppet state of Manchukuo, headed by the last emperor of the Ping dynasty, Henry Pu Yi. The Japanese invaders established a military-police regime in it. Manchuria was turned into a springboard for aggression against the USSR, Mongolia and China.

The first step of aggression was the Japanese invasion in July 1938 on Soviet territory near Lake. Hassan. This unremarkable border strip of land, cut by hills and river valleys, became the site of heated battles. Soviet troops won an important victory here in stubborn battles. However, the Japanese aggressors did not calm down. They began to prepare for a larger-scale military action, and not only for the purpose of revenge.

In the fall of 1938, the General Staff of the Japanese Army developed a war plan against the Mongolian People's Republic and the USSR, which provided for the seizure of the Mongolian People's Republic and the capture of Soviet Primorye. The Japanese General Staff planned to cut the Trans-Siberian Railway and tear the Far East away from the rest of the Soviet Union. According to one of the officers of the Japanese General Staff, the main strategic plan of the Japanese command under this plan was to concentrate the main military forces in Eastern Manchuria and direct them against the Soviet Far East. The Kwantung Army was supposed to capture Ussuriysk, Vladivostok, and then Khabarovsk and Blagoveshchensk.

Soviet tank crews inspect a Japanese tank Type 95 "Ha-go" abandoned on the battlefield - a Manchurian version, Lieutenant Ito from the 4th Japanese light tank regiment of Colonel Tamada. Khalkhin Gol River area, July 3, 1939. These tanks were nicknamed "little ones" by Soviet tankers.

In May 1939, the battle between Japanese and Soviet troops began on the Khalkhin Gol River. The armed conflict took place in April-September 1939 near the Khalkhin Gol River in Mongolia, not far from the border with Manchuria.

Victory in this battle predetermined Japan's non-interference in Germany's aggression against the USSR, which saved Russia from the need to fight on two fronts in World War II. The troops were commanded by the future Marshal of Victory Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov.

Western historiography suppresses and distorts the military events at Khalkhin Gol in 1939. The name Khalkhin Gol is not in Western literature; instead, the term Nomon Khan incident (named after the border mountain), allegedly provoked by the Soviet side to show its military strength, is used . Western historiographers claim that this was an isolated military action, a terrifying operation, allegedly imposed on the Japanese by the Soviet Union.

On June 1, 1939, the deputy commander of the troops of the Belarusian Military District, Zhukov, was urgently summoned to the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov. The day before, Voroshilov had a meeting. Chief of the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov reported on the situation at Khalkin Gol. Voroshilov noted that a good cavalry commander would be more suitable to lead the fighting there. Zhukov’s candidacy immediately surfaced. Voroshilov accepted the authoritative proposal of the Chief of the General Staff Shaposhnikov.

June 5 G.K. Zhukov arrived at the headquarters of the Soviet 57th separate corps, located in Mongolia. For several days the division commander’s car drove around the steppe; Zhukov personally wanted to inspect everything. With the experienced eye of a commander, he assessed the weaknesses and strengths of the few Soviet-Mongolian troops that reached the Khalkin-Gol area. He sends an urgent message to Moscow: it is necessary to immediately strengthen Soviet aviation, send at least three rifle divisions and a tank brigade to Mongolia. Goal: prepare a counterattack. Zhukov's proposals were accepted. Zhukov was in a hurry to strengthen the defenses at Khalkin-Gol, especially on the bridgehead across the river, then it was necessary to bring up reserves from the Soviet Union as quickly as possible.

Soviet tanks cross the Khalkin Gol River.

The Japanese railways, in terms of the volume of delivery of troops and equipment, were significantly ahead of the Soviet 650-kilometer dirt road along which the delivery and supply of Soviet troops was carried out.

The Japanese managed to concentrate up to 40 thousand troops, 310 guns, 135 tanks and 225 aircraft. Before dawn on July 3, the Soviet colonel rode to Mount Bain-Tsagan, on the northern flank of the front, along Khalkin-Gol to check the defense of the Mongolian cavalry division. Suddenly he came across Japanese troops already crossing the river. With the first rays of the sun, Zhukov was already here. The enemy was going to carry out a textbook operation: with a strike from the north, encircle and destroy the Soviet-Mongolian troops holding the front along Khalkin-Gol. However, the Japanese did not take Zhukov’s instant reaction into account.

Georgy Konstantinovich did not have time to think about the strength of the enemy. He called in aviation to bomb the crossing, redirected some of the battery fire from the central area here and ordered the 11th tank brigade of brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev to be brought into battle. Zhukov took an unprecedented risk: he gave Yakovlev the order to attack the enemy on the move, at dusk, without waiting for the infantry. The summoned motorized rifle regiment arrived only in the morning.

A machine gunner of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army covers the advancing troops with fire. The machine gun's flame arrester is mounted on the barrel in the "stowed" position.

On the morning of July 5, the enemy was completely defeated, thousands of corpses littered the ground, crushed and broken guns, machine guns, and vehicles. The remnants of the enemy group rushed to the crossing. Its commander, General Kamatsubara (formerly the military attache of Japan in Moscow), was among the first to be on the other side, and soon “the crossing,” Zhukov recalled, “was blown up by their own sappers, who feared a breakthrough by our tanks. Japanese officers threw themselves in full gear straight into the water and immediately drowned, literally before the eyes of our tank crews.”

The enemy lost up to ten thousand people, almost all tanks, most of the artillery, but the Kwantung Army spared nothing to save face. Day and night, new troops were brought to Khalkin-Gol, from which the 6th Special Army of General Ogisu deployed. 75 thousand personnel, 182 tanks, more than 300 aircraft, 500 guns, including heavy ones, urgently removed from the forts in Port Arthur and delivered to Khalkin Gol. The 6th Special Army clung to Mongolian soil - it occupied 74 kilometers along the front and 20 kilometers in depth. At the end of August, General Ogishi's headquarters was preparing a new offensive.

Combat operations to encircle and destroy the Japanese 6th Army on August 20 - 31, 1939.

Delay in expelling the aggressor was fraught with the most serious consequences. Therefore, Zhukov prepared an operation plan to destroy the enemy. Its goal: to destroy the 6th Special Army, preventing it from leaving the cordon. Moreover, under no circumstances should the fighting be transferred beyond the Mongolian border, so as not to give Tokyo a reason to shout to the whole world about “Soviet aggression” with the ensuing consequences.

Preparing a strike for destruction, Zhukov lulled the enemy's vigilance, creating the impression that the Soviet-Mongolian troops were thinking only about defense. Winter positions were built, soldiers were given instructions on how to conduct defensive battles, and all this was brought to the attention of Japanese intelligence by a variety of means.

Psychologically, Zhukov’s calculations were impeccable - this corresponded to the samurai’s idea that, they say, the Russians had “come to their senses” and were afraid of a new battle. The Japanese troops became insolent before our eyes; they again and again launched frequent operations, which ended with another beating of them. Intense fighting continued in the air.

Motorized infantry of the 149th Infantry Regiment monitors the deployment of tanks from the 11th Tank Brigade. Area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River, end of May 1939.

By the beginning of the Soviet counteroffensive, Zhukov’s 1st army group consisted of about 57 thousand people, 542 guns and mortars, 498 tanks, 385 armored vehicles and 515 combat aircraft.

Thanks to Zhukov’s carefully thought-out system of disinformation, it was possible to hide the approach of large units from the Soviet Union from the enemy. By mid-August, the Soviet-Mongolian forces under the command of Corps Commander Zhukov (who received this rank on July 31) numbered 57 thousand people, 498 tanks, 385 armored vehicles, 542 guns and mortars and 515 combat aircraft. This whole colossus had to be taken and secretly placed in the bare steppe, and before the start of the offensive, scheduled for Sunday, August 20, it had to be quietly brought to its original positions. Which we managed to do brilliantly. Up to 80 percent of the troops that were to attack were concentrated in enveloping groups.

On this Sunday, the Japanese command allowed many generals and senior officers to leave for the rear. And Zhukov prudently took this into account, scheduling the offensive precisely for August 20th.

Khalkhin Gol. Soviet artillery spotters at an observation post.

The opposing Japanese group - the Japanese 6th separate army, specially formed by imperial decree under the command of General Ryuhei Ogisu (Japanese), included the 7th and 23rd infantry divisions, a separate infantry brigade, seven artillery regiments, two tank regiments of the Manchurian brigades, three regiments of Bargut cavalry, two engineering regiments and other units, which in total amounted to more than 75 thousand people, 500 artillery pieces, 182 tanks, 700 aircraft. The Japanese 6th Army was professional - most of the soldiers gained combat experience during the war in China, unlike the soldiers of the Red Army who basically had no combat experience, except for professional military pilots and tank crews.

At 5.45 am, Soviet artillery opened powerful fire on the enemy, especially on available anti-aircraft weapons. Soon, 150 bombers, covered by 100 fighters, attacked Japanese positions. The artillery barrage and air bombardment lasted three hours. Then the offensive began along the entire seventy-kilometer front. The main attacks were carried out on the flanks, where Soviet tank and mechanized units acted.

Khalkhin Gol. Briefing Japanese tank crews at the Type 89 tank - "Yi-Go", in the Mongolian steppe during the offensive. In the background is a Chi-Ha tank - Type 97 and Type 93 staff vehicles.

According to Japanese data, of the 73 tanks that took part in the Yasuoka group’s attack on the Soviet bridgehead on July 3, 41 tanks were lost, of which 18 were irretrievably lost. Already on July 5, the tank regiments were withdrawn from the battle, “due to loss of combat effectiveness,” and on the 9th they returned to place of permanent deployment.

Captured Japanese soldiers at Khalkin Gol.

Three-day attempts by the enemy to release it from Manchuria were repulsed. Attempts by the Japanese command to carry out counterattacks and release the group encircled in the Khalkhin Gol area ended in failure. On August 24, the regiments of the 14th Infantry Brigade of the Kwantung Army, which approached the Mongolian border from Hailar, entered into battle with the 80th Infantry Regiment covering the border, but neither that day nor the next day they were able to break through and retreated to the territory of Manchukuo. Go.

The medium Japanese tank "Type 89" - "Yi-Go" - was knocked out during the battle at Khalkin-Gol.

After the battles of August 24-26, the command of the Kwantung Army, until the very end of the operation on Khalkhin Gol, no longer attempted to relieve its encircled troops, having accepted the inevitability of their death. On August 31, Corps Commander Zhukov reported on the successful completion of the operation. Japanese troops lost about 61 thousand killed, wounded and prisoners at Khalkin Gol, Soviet-Mongolian troops - 18.5 thousand killed and wounded. On September 15, 1939, an agreement to eliminate the conflict was signed in Moscow.

Khalkhin Gol. BT-7 tanks and Red Army infantrymen attack enemy troops.

On the first day of the offensive, the command of the Japanese 6th Army was unable to determine the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops and made no attempt to provide support to its troops defending on the flanks.

By the end of August 26, the armored and mechanized troops of the Southern and Northern groups of Soviet-Mongolian forces had united and completed the complete encirclement of the Japanese 6th Army. With the formation of an external front along the border of Mongolia, the destruction of the Japanese army, which found itself in a cauldron, began - the crushing of enemy units with cutting blows and destruction in parts began.

Commander 2nd Rank G.M. Stern, Marshal of the Mongolian People's Republic H. Choibalsan and corps commander G.K. Zhukov at the Hamar-Daba command post. Khalkhin Gol, 1939.

The extent of the disaster that befell the Japanese army could not be hidden from the international community; the defeat of the 6th Army was observed by numerous foreign war correspondents, whom the Japanese allowed to be present to cover the blitzkrieg against Russia. Hitler immediately wanted to be friends with the USSR when he learned that the Japanese professional army was defeated under the most favorable conditions for it, in a place that it itself had chosen for combat operations. During the German-Soviet negotiations, a trade agreement that was very beneficial for Russia was signed, the main point of which was the receipt of a huge loan from Germany for the purchase of industrial equipment.

Raising the red banner over the Khalkhin Gol River.

Modern Japanese school history textbooks modestly conceal the extent of the total defeat that befell the Japanese Imperial Army, and the conflict itself in which the 6th Army was destroyed is described as a “small armed conflict.”

The Soviet victory at Khalkhin Gol led to a change in Japan's expansionist aspirations against Russia towards the countries of the Pacific region. Hitler unsuccessfully demanded that Japan attack the USSR in the Far East when his troops approached Moscow in December 1941. The defeat at Khalkhin Gol led to a change in strategic plans, and the deployment of troops and military infrastructure was moved by the Japanese to the Pacific region, which was more “promising” for military aggression.

Tank type 89 of the adjutant of the commander of the 3rd tank regiment, Captain Koga, knocked out on July 3, 1939 at Khalkhin Gol.

The main result of the battles at Khalkhin Gol, according to many researchers, is that the crushing defeat of the Japanese troops largely influenced the decision of the ruling circles of the Land of the Rising Sun not to cooperate with Nazi Germany in its attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941. Such was the price of the defeat on the Mongolian border of the 6th Special Japanese Army and the color aviation of the Kwantung Army. The events on the Khalkhin Gol River became an object lesson for official Tokyo and the imperial generals, who came from the samurai class.

Japanese infantry crossing the river. Khalkhin Gol

In foreign historiography, particularly in American and Japanese, the term “Khalkin Gol” is used only to name the river, and the military conflict itself is called the “Nomon Khan Incident.” "Nomon Khan" is the name of one of the mountains in this area of ​​the Manchu-Mongol border.

Background to the conflict

The conflict began with the demands of the Japanese side to recognize the Khalkhin Gol River as the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia, although the border ran 20-25 km to the east. The main reason for this requirement was the desire to ensure the safety of the railway being built by the Japanese in this area, bypassing the Greater Khingan Khalun-Arshan - Ganchzhur to the USSR border in the area of ​​Irkutsk and Lake Baikal, since in some places the distance from the road to the border was only two or three kilometers. To substantiate their claims, Japanese cartographers fabricated false maps with the border along Khalkhin Gol and “ a special order was issued to destroy a number of authoritative Japanese reference publications, the maps of which showed the correct border in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River» .

May 1939. First battles

The Soviet command took radical measures. On May 29, a group of ace pilots led by Deputy Chief of the Red Army Air Force Yakov Smushkevich flew from Moscow to the combat area. 17 of them were heroes of the Soviet Union, many had combat experience in the skies of Spain and China. They began training pilots and reorganized and strengthened the air surveillance, warning and communications system. After this, the forces of the parties in the air became approximately equal.

Downed Soviet fighter

At the beginning of June, Feklenko was recalled to Moscow, and G. K. Zhukov was appointed in his place, at the suggestion of the head of the operational department of the General Staff, M. V. Zakharov. Brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, who arrived with Zhukov, became the chief of staff of the corps. Soon after arriving in the area of ​​military conflict in June, the chief of staff of the Soviet command proposed a new combat plan: conducting an active defense on the bridgehead beyond Khalkhin Gol and preparing a strong counterattack against the opposing group of the Japanese Kwantung Army. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army agreed with Bogdanov's proposals. The necessary forces began to gather in the area of ​​​​combat operations: the troops were transported along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Ulan-Ude, and then through the territory of Mongolia they followed in marching order for 1300-1400 km. Corps Commissar J. Lkhagvasuren became Zhukov’s assistant in command of the Mongolian cavalry.

To coordinate the actions of Soviet troops in the Far East and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, the commander of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army, commander of the 2nd rank G. M. Stern, arrived from Chita to the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River.

Downed Japanese plane

Air battles resumed with renewed vigor on June 20. In the battles of June 22, 24 and 26, the Japanese lost more than 50 aircraft.

Throughout June, the Soviet side was busy organizing defenses on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol and planning a decisive counteroffensive. To ensure air supremacy, new Soviet modernized I-16 and Chaika fighters were deployed here, which for the first time in the world used combat unguided air-to-air missiles, later used to create multiple launch rocket systems. Thus, as a result of the battle on June 22, which became widely known in Japan (in this battle, the famous Japanese ace pilot Takeo Fukuda, who became famous during the war in China, was shot down and captured), the superiority of Soviet aviation over Japanese aviation was ensured and it was possible to seize dominance in the air . In total, Japanese air forces lost 90 aircraft in air battles from June 22 to 28. The losses of Soviet aviation turned out to be much smaller - 38 aircraft.

July. Japanese attack

Komkor G.K. Zhukov and Marshal Choibalsan

Fierce fighting broke out around Mount Bayan-Tsagan. On both sides, up to 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 800 artillery pieces and hundreds of aircraft took part in them. Soviet artillerymen fired direct fire at the enemy, and at some points there were up to 300 aircraft on both sides in the sky above the mountain. The 149th Rifle Regiment of Major I.M. Remizov and the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment of I.I. Fedyuninsky especially distinguished themselves in these battles.

On the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, by the night of July 3, Soviet troops, due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, retreated to the river, reducing the size of their eastern bridgehead on its bank, but the Japanese strike force under the command of Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoki did not complete its task.

The group of Japanese troops on Mount Bayan-Tsagan found themselves semi-surrounded. By the evening of July 4, Japanese troops held only the top of Bayan-Tsagan - a narrow strip of terrain five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. On July 5, Japanese troops began to retreat towards the river. In order to force their soldiers to fight to the last, by order of the Japanese command, the only pontoon bridge across Khalkhin Gol at their disposal was blown up. In the end, Japanese troops at Mount Bayan-Tsagan began a wholesale retreat from their positions by the morning of July 5. According to some Russian historians, more than 10 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers died on the slopes of Mount Bayan-Tsagan, although according to the Japanese themselves, their total losses for the entire period of hostilities amounted to 8,632 people. killed. However, it should be noted that some sources indicate total losses on both sides at 120 thousand people, which significantly contradicts official, both Soviet (7632 people killed) and Japanese data (8632 people killed). The Japanese side lost almost all their tanks and most of their artillery. These events became known as the “Bayan-Tsagan Massacre.”

The result of these battles was that in the future, as Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, Japanese troops “no longer dared to cross to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River.” All further events took place on the eastern bank of the river.

However, Japanese troops continued to remain on Mongolia, and the Japanese military leadership planned new offensive operations. Thus, the source of conflict in the Khalkhin Gol region remained. The situation dictated the need to restore the state border of Mongolia and radically resolve this border conflict. Therefore, Zhukov began to plan an offensive operation with the goal of completely defeating the entire Japanese group located on the territory of Mongolia.

The 57th Special Corps was deployed to the 1st Army (Front) Group under the command of Army Commander Grigory Mikhailovich Stern. In accordance with the resolution of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, for the leadership of the troops, the Military Council of the Army Group was established, consisting of: commander commander of the 2nd rank Stern G. M., chief of staff corps commander Bogdanov M. A., aviation commander corps commander Ya. V. Smushkevich, corps commander Zhukov G.K., divisional commissar Nikishev M.S.

New troops, including the 82nd Infantry Division, urgently began to be transferred to the site of the conflict. The 37th tank brigade, armed with BT-7 and BT-5 tanks, was transferred from the Moscow Military District; partial mobilization was carried out on the territory of the Trans-Baikal Military District and the 114th and 93rd rifle divisions were formed.

General Ogisu and his staff also planned an offensive, which was scheduled for 24 August. Moreover, taking into account the sad experience of the battles on Mount Bayan-Tsagan for the Japanese, this time the enveloping strike was planned on the right flank of the Soviet group. Crossing the river was not planned.

During Zhukov’s preparation for the offensive operation of the Soviet and Mongolian troops, a plan for operational-tactical deception of the enemy was carefully developed and strictly followed. All troop movements in the front-line zone were carried out only in the dark, it was strictly forbidden to send troops into the initial areas for the offensive, reconnaissance on the ground by command personnel was carried out only in trucks and in the uniform of ordinary Red Army soldiers. To mislead the enemy in the early period of preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side at night, using sound installations, imitated the noise of the movement of tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft and engineering work. Soon the Japanese got tired of reacting to sources of noise, so during the actual regrouping of Soviet troops, their opposition was minimal. Also, throughout the preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side carried out active electronic warfare with the enemy. Knowing that the Japanese were conducting active radio reconnaissance and listening to telephone conversations, a program of false radio and telephone messages was developed in order to misinform the enemy. Negotiations were conducted only on the construction of defensive structures and preparations for the autumn-winter campaign. Radio traffic in these cases was based on an easily decipherable code.

Despite the overall superiority in forces of the Japanese side, by the beginning of the offensive Stern managed to achieve almost three times superiority in tanks and 1.7 times in aircraft. To carry out the offensive operation, two-week reserves of ammunition, food and fuel and lubricants were created. More than 4 thousand trucks and 375 tank trucks were used to transport goods over a distance of 1300-1400 kilometers. It should be noted that one road trip with cargo and back lasted five days.

During the offensive operation, Zhukov, using maneuverable mechanized and tank units, planned to encircle and destroy the enemy in the area between the state border of the MPR and the Khalkhin Gol River with unexpected strong flank attacks. At Khalkhin Gol, for the first time in world military practice, tank and mechanized units were used to solve operational problems as the main striking force of flank groups performing an encirclement maneuver.

The advancing troops were divided into three groups - Southern, Northern and Central. The main blow was delivered by the Southern group under the command of Colonel M. I. Potapov, an auxiliary blow by the Northern group, commanded by Colonel I. P. Alekseenko. The central group under the command of brigade commander D.E. Petrov was supposed to pin down enemy forces in the center, on the front line, thereby depriving them of the ability to maneuver. The reserve, concentrated in the center, included the 212th airborne, 9th motorized armored brigades and a tank battalion. Also participating in the operation were Mongolian troops - the 6th and 8th Cavalry Divisions under the overall command of Marshal X. Choibalsan.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops began on August 20, thereby preempting the offensive of the Japanese troops, scheduled for August 24.

Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army at Khalkhin Gol, 1939.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, which began on August 20, turned out to be a complete surprise for the Japanese command.

At 6:15 a.m., powerful artillery preparation and air raids on enemy positions began. At 9 o'clock the offensive of the ground forces began. On the first day of the offensive, the attacking troops acted in full accordance with plans, with the exception of a hitch that occurred when crossing tanks of the 6th Tank Brigade, since when crossing Khalkhin Gol, the pontoon bridge built by sappers could not withstand the weight of the tanks.

The enemy offered the most stubborn resistance on the central sector of the front, where the Japanese had well-equipped engineering fortifications. Here the attackers managed to advance only 500-1000 meters in a day.

Already on August 21 and 22, the Japanese troops, having come to their senses, fought stubborn defensive battles, so Zhukov had to bring the reserve 9th motorized armored brigade into the battle.

Soviet tanks crossing the river. Khalkhin Gol

Soviet aviation also performed well at this time. On August 24 and 25 alone, SB bombers made 218 combat group sorties and dropped about 96 tons of bombs on the enemy. During these two days, fighters shot down about 70 Japanese planes in air battles.

In general, it should be noted that the command of the Japanese 6th Army on the first day of the offensive was unable to determine the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops and did not attempt to provide support to its troops defending on the flanks. By the end of August 26, the armored and mechanized troops of the Southern and Northern groups of Soviet-Mongolian forces had united and completed the complete encirclement of the Japanese 6th Army. After this, it began to be crushed by cutting blows and destroyed in parts.

Captured Japanese soldiers

In general, Japanese soldiers, mostly infantrymen, as Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, fought extremely fiercely and extremely stubbornly, to the last man. Often Japanese dugouts and bunkers were captured only when there was no longer a single living Japanese soldier there. As a result of the stubborn resistance of the Japanese, on August 23 on the Central sector of the front, Zhukov even had to bring his last reserve into battle: the 212th airborne brigade and two companies of border guards. At the same time, he took a considerable risk, since the commander’s closest reserve - the Mongolian armored brigade - was located in Tamtsak-Bulak, 120 kilometers from the front.

Repeated attempts by the Japanese command to carry out counterattacks and release the group encircled in the Khalkhin Gol area ended in failure. On August 24, the regiments of the 14th Infantry Brigade of the Kwantung Army, which approached the Mongolian border from Hailar, entered into battle with the 80th Infantry Regiment covering the border, but neither that day nor the next were able to break through and retreated to the territory of Manchukuo . After the battles of August 24-26, the command of the Kwantung Army, until the very end of the operation on Khalkhin Gol, no longer attempted to release its encircled troops, having accepted the inevitability of their death.

The Red Army captured as trophies 100 vehicles, 30 heavy and 145 field guns, 42 thousand shells, 115 heavy and 225 light machine guns, 12 thousand rifles and about 2 million rounds of ammunition, and much other military equipment.

The last battles continued on August 29 and 30 in the area north of the Khaylastyn-Gol River. By the morning of August 31, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was completely cleared of Japanese troops. However, this was not yet the complete end of hostilities.

Through its ambassador in Moscow, Shigenori Togo, the Japanese government appealed to the USSR government with a request to cease hostilities on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic and Japan on the cessation of hostilities in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River, which came into force the next day.

Results

The victory of the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic at Khalkhin Gol became one of the reasons for Japan's non-aggression against the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Immediately after the start of the war, the Japanese General Staff, taking into account, among other things, the experience of Khalkhin Gol, decided to enter the war against the USSR only if Moscow fell before the end of August. In response to Hitler's demand in a telegram dated June 30 to immediately fulfill his allied obligations and strike the USSR from the east, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers on July 2, the final decision was made to wait until Germany was sure to win.

In Japan, the defeat and the simultaneous signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact led to a government crisis and the resignation of the cabinet of Hiranuma Kiichiro. The new Japanese government announced on September 4 that it did not intend to intervene in any form in the conflict in Europe, and on September 15 signed an armistice agreement, which led to the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact on April 13, 1941. In the traditional confrontation between the Japanese army and navy, the “maritime party” won, defending the idea of ​​cautious expansion in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. The German military leadership, having studied the experience of the Japanese wars in China and Khalkhin Gol, rated Japan’s military capabilities very low and did not recommend that Hitler commit himself to an alliance with it.

The fighting on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic coincided with negotiations between Japanese Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita (English) Russian with the British ambassador in Tokyo, Robert Craigie. In July 1939, an agreement was concluded between England and Japan, according to which Great Britain recognized the Japanese seizures in China (thus providing diplomatic support for aggression against the Mongolian People's Republic and its ally, the USSR). At the same time, the US government extended the trade agreement with Japan, denounced on January 26, for six months, and then fully restored it. As part of the agreement, Japan purchased trucks for the Kwantung Army, machine tools for aircraft factories for $3 million, strategic materials (until 10/16/1940 - steel and iron scrap, until 07/26/1941 - gasoline and petroleum products), etc. A new embargo was imposed only on July 26 1941. However, the official position of the US government did not mean a complete cessation of trade. Goods and even strategic raw materials continued to flow into Japan until the outbreak of war with the United States.

The impact of the Khalkhin-Gol campaign on the Sino-Japanese War is poorly understood.

"Golden Star"

The aviation commander of the 1st Army Group, Ya. V. Smushkevich, and Army Commander G. M. Stern were awarded Gold Star medals for the battles at Khalkhin Gol. After the end of the conflict, Smushkevich was appointed head of the Red Army Air Force, Stern commanded the 8th Army during the Soviet-Finnish War. In June 1941, both military leaders were arrested and executed a few months later. Rehabilitated in 1954.

The chief of staff of the 1st Army Group, brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on November 17, 1939. At the end of hostilities in September 1939, by order of the USSR NKO, he was appointed deputy commander of the 1st Army Group (Ulaanbaatar). In the same month, by Decree of the Government of the USSR, he was appointed chairman of the Soviet-Mongolian delegation to the Mixed Commission to resolve controversial issues regarding the state border between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchuria in the conflict area. At the end of the negotiations, as a result of provocation on the Japanese side, Bogdanov made a “gross mistake that damaged the prestige of the USSR,” for which he was put on trial. On March 1, 1940, he was convicted by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR under Art. 193-17 paragraph “a” for 4 years ITL. By a resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 23, 1941, he was amnestied with his criminal record expunged and placed at the disposal of NGOs of the USSR. He ended the Great Patriotic War with the position of division commander and the rank of major general.

Propaganda in the USSR

The events at Khalkhin Gol became an important element of propaganda in the USSR. Novels, poems and songs were written, articles were published in newspapers. The essence of the propaganda boiled down to the idea of ​​the invincibility of the Red Army in a future war. Participants in the tragic events of the summer of 1941 many times noted the harm of excessive optimism on the eve of the great war.

In literature

• Simonov K. M. - novel “Comrades in Arms.”
• Simonov K.M. - poem “Far in the East”.
• Simonov K.M. - poem “Tank”.

In cinema

• « Khalkhin Gol"() - documentary film, TsSDF.
• “Listen, on the other side” () - Soviet-Mongolian feature film dedicated to the battles at Khalkhin Gol.
• “Officers” (, dir. V. Rogovoy) - in one of the episodes of the film, the heroes of G. Yumatov and V. Lanovoy meet in the context of a military conflict on Khalkhin Gol.
• “I, Shapovalov T. P.” (, dir. Karelov E. E.) - the first part of the “High Rank” dilogy, an episode in the film.
• “On the Roads of the Fathers” () - a television film by Irkutsk television journalist Natalya Volina, dedicated to the 65th anniversary of the end of the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River and the Soviet-Mongolian expedition to places of military glory.
• "Khalkin-Gol. Unknown War"() - a documentary film dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the victory on the Khalkhin Gol River. The film uses a large amount of chronicles, as well as comments from veteran participants in those events and historians.

Literature

• Bakaev D. A. Khasan and Khalkhin Gol are on fire. Saratov, Volga region publishing house, 1984. - 151 pages.
• Vorozheikin A.V. Stronger than death. - M.: Children's literature, 1978.
• Vorotnikov M. F. G.K. Zhukov on Khalkhin Gol. Omsk: book publishing house, 1989-224 pp. (circulation 10,000 copies)
• Gorbunov E. A. August 20, 1939. M., “Young Guard”, 1986.
• Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. (Chapter 7. The undeclared war on Khalkhin Gol). - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2002.
• Kondratyev V. Khalkhin Gol: War in the Air. - M.: Techniki - Youth, 2002.
• Kondratyev V. Battle over the steppe. Aviation in the Soviet-Japanese armed conflict on the Khalkhin Gol River. - M.: Aviation Promotion Foundation “Russian Knights”, 2008. - 144 p. - (Series: Air Wars of the 20th Century). - 2000 copies. - ISBN 978-5-903389-11-7
• Koshkin A. A."Kantokuen" - "Barbarossa" in Japanese. Why Japan didn't attack the USSR.
• Koshkin A. A. The collapse of the “Ripe Persimmon” strategy: Japan’s military policy towards the USSR 1931-1945. - M.: Mysl, 1989. - 272 p.
• Kuznetsov I. I. Heroes of Khalkhin Gol. 3rd ed., add. Ulaanbaatar, Gosizdat, 1984-144 pp.
• Simonov K. M. Far to the east. Khalkhin-Gol Notes. - M.: Fiction, 1985.
• At Khalkhin Gol. Memoirs of Leningraders who took part in battles with Japanese militarists in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River in 1939. Comp. N. M. Rumyantsev. - L.: Lenizdat, 1989.
• Novikov M.V. Victory at Khalkhin Gol. - M.: Politizdat, 1971. - 110 p. - 150,000 copies.
• Panasovsky V. E. Lessons from Hassan and Khalkhin Gol. M., “Knowledge”, 1989.
• Fedyuninsky I.I. In the East. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1985.
• Shishov A.V. Russia and Japan. History of military conflicts. - M.: Veche, 2001.

see also

• List of associations, formations, units and subunits that were part of the Active Army in the area of ​​the river. Khalkhin Gol in 1939

Notes

1. Team of authors. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century: Losses of the Armed Forces / G. F. Krivosheev. - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2001. - P. 177. - 608 p. - (Archive). - 5,000 copies. - ISBN 5-224-01515-4
2. History of the Second World War. 1939-1945 (in 12 volumes). volume 2, M., Voenizdat, 1974. p.217
3. (English) . Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1981. Retrieved June 20, 2010.
4. Team of authors. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century: A statistical study. M., 2001. P. 179
5. Kolomiets M. Fighting near the Khalkhin Gol River, May-September 1939. M., 2002. P. 65.

From the very beginning of the 30s of the last century, the Japanese authorities nurtured hostile plans regarding the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). In 1933, General Araki, the Minister of War of Japan, publicly demanded the capture of this country. In 1935, on all Japanese maps, the state border of the MPR in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River was moved inland by twenty kilometers. At the end of January of the same year, Japanese troops attacked a number of border outposts abandoned by the Mongols without a fight. To prevent the conflict that arose, negotiations began in the summer. However, they were soon interrupted, as Japanese representatives demanded that their representatives be allowed to reside permanently in various points of the Mongolian People's Republic. Mongolia rightly regarded this as a direct attack on its independence. In retaliation, Japanese diplomats promised to resolve all pressing issues at their own discretion.

Commander 2nd Rank G.M. Stern, Marshal of the Mongolian People's Republic H. Choibalsan and corps commander G.K. Zhukov at the Hamar-Daba command post. Khalkhin Gol, 1939

The spring of 1936 passed in minor skirmishes on the Mongol-Manchurian border. Trying to protect itself, on March 12 the Mongolian People's Republic signed a protocol on mutual assistance with the USSR. At the session of the Supreme Council on May 31, Molotov confirmed that the Soviet Union would defend the borders of the MPR in the same way as its own. In September 1937, thirty thousand Soviet soldiers, more than two hundred tanks and armored vehicles, and about a hundred aircraft arrived in Mongolia. The headquarters of the fifty-seventh special corps, under the command of N.V. Feklenko, was located in Ulaanbaatar.

However, this did not stop the Japanese, who continued to prepare for the attack. They chose the area near Khalkhin Gol for the invasion, since the distance from this river to the nearest Soviet railway station was more than 750 kilometers. From Manchuria, two railways passed here.

Unfortunately, the Mongolian leadership and the command staff of the Soviet corps showed unforgivable negligence by failing to prepare and study the area. The border across the river was not guarded, and there were no observation posts on the western bank. Our soldiers were engaged in wood harvesting. At this time, the Japanese carried out reconnaissance of the future site of hostilities, issued excellent maps, and conducted field trips by the officers of the troops assigned to the operation.

The calm ended in January 1939. In the river area there are attacks on guard posts and shelling of border guards. The full-scale invasion began in May. On the 11th, 14th and 15th, armed Japanese-Manchu detachments numbering from two hundred to seven hundred people, accompanied by several armored vehicles, violated the border and got involved in battles with border guards. Japanese planes bombed Mongolian border outposts, but the leadership of the 57th Corps still did nothing. It is known that on May 15 our entire command went to logging. Only on the 16th did Voroshilov’s order come, demanding that the troops be put on combat readiness.

The sixth cavalry division of the MPR sent to the river and the operational group of the eleventh tank brigade under the leadership of senior lieutenant Bykov on May 21 managed to push the enemy beyond Khalkin-Gol to the land of Manchuria. At the same time, in Moscow, the Japanese ambassador received an official statement on behalf of the Soviet government: “Japanese-Manchu troops violated the border of the Mongolian People's Republic, attacking Mongolian units without warning. Among the MPR soldiers there are wounded and killed. Japanese-Manchurian aviation also took part in the invasion. Since all patience comes to an end, we ask that this no longer happen.” The text of the statement was sent to Tokyo. There was no answer to it.

Early in the morning of May 28, Japanese troops struck a new blow, crushing the Mongol cavalry and deeply enveloping the left flank of Bykov's detachment, threatening the crossing. Having barely escaped capture, the Mongol-Soviet units retreated to the hills a couple of kilometers from the crossing, where they were able to detain the enemy. The 149th Infantry Regiment came to the rescue in vehicles and immediately entered the battle. The firefight lasted all night, and in the morning the right flank of Bykov’s company was knocked out from its heights, mistakenly fired upon by friendly artillery. But flamethrower tanks on the left flank destroyed the Japanese reconnaissance detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Azuma.

The battle died down only in the evening. Having suffered significant losses, the Japanese withdrew their troops to their territory, and the Soviet units left the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol. Feklenko later reported to Moscow that this had to be done “under pressure from many times superior enemy forces.” Although the very absence of the Japanese was discovered by Soviet intelligence only four days later. As a result of the battles, Feklenko was removed from his post, and G.K. Zhukov arrived to replace him.

Since the May battles showed a significant superiority of enemy aviation, the first thing the Soviet command decided to do was increase its air force. In the last days of May, the 38th bomber and 22nd fighter air regiments arrived at the 100th mixed aviation brigade already stationed in Mongolia. The struggle for air supremacy began.

From the memoirs of fighter pilot Hero of the Soviet Union Anton Yakimenko: “We were placed at the airfield in a yurt. In addition to the cold and lack of basic amenities, mosquitoes plagued us. Because of them, I couldn’t sleep; my bitten face was swollen and burning. One night a hurricane arose and toppled the yurt. In the morning we barely crawled out of the sand-covered hole. The U-2 plane was broken in half by the storm. There was so much sand packed into the fuselages of our I-16s that when we took off, the sand flew out like smoke, leaving a tail behind the plane.”

On May 27, eight aircraft of the I-16 squadron located at the airfield near Mount Khamar-Daba received an order to take off on alert. This was already the fourth flight that day. There had been no meetings with the Japanese up to this point, but two pilots burned out the engines of their planes and remained at the base. Six I-16 fighters flew to the border one at a time, gradually gaining altitude. At an altitude of two thousand meters they encountered two flights of Japanese fighters flying in formation. Finding themselves in a losing position, after the first attack the pilots turned around and began to return, and the enemy above them shot them before the airfield and even after landing. The result of the “battle” was disastrous - two of our pilots (including the squadron commander) were killed, one was wounded, two of the remaining ones burned out their engines. In the evening, People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov very clearly explained to the command of the 57th Corps Moscow's position on the inadmissibility of such losses in the future.

However, May 28 was a truly “black” day for domestic aviation. Out of twenty aircraft, only three I-15 bis fighters managed to carry out the order to fly to a given area. The rest were taken by surprise by the new order to “stop the flight.” There was no radio contact with the flight that took off; the pilots did not even realize that they were alone. During a mission over the Khalkhin Gol River, they were destroyed by superior Japanese forces. Three hours later, another I-15 squadron of ten fighters was suddenly attacked in the clouds. Seven aircraft were killed very quickly, the enemy lost only one. After this day, Soviet aircraft were not visible over Khalkhin Gol for two weeks, and the Japanese dropped bombs on our troops with impunity.

From the story of fighter pilot Anton Yakimenko: “The war started unsuccessfully for us. The Japanese managed to seize air superiority. Why did it happen? We met Japanese veterans over Khalkhin Gol who had previously fought in China for two years. We had no combat experience and were not yet ready to kill.”

Nevertheless, Moscow's reaction to what happened was immediate. Already on May 29, the best Soviet aces, led by the deputy chief of the Red Army Air Force Smushkevich, flew to Mongolia. In just a few weeks, a huge amount of work was carried out: training of flight personnel was established, supplies were improved, and a network of takeoff and landing sites was created. The number of vehicles was increased to 300 units, against 239 for the enemy.

In the next air battle on June 22, the Japanese were confronted by a completely different enemy. The result of a grandiose fierce battle that lasted more than two hours was the retreat of the pilots of the Land of the Rising Sun, who lost 30 aircraft. Our losses were also huge - 17 vehicles did not return to their bases. However, this was the first air victory since the beginning of the war.

The next three days showed that the Japanese would not be able to cope with Russian pilots in the air, and then they decided to change tactics. On the morning of June 27, about thirty Japanese bombers, together with 74 fighters, attacked our airfields. In the areas of Tamtsak-Bulak and Bain-Tumen, they managed to detect the approach of the Japanese and scramble fighters to intercept them, thwarting the attacks. But in Bayin-Burdu-Nur everything turned out differently. The observation posts saw the enemy planes, however, presumably due to the actions of saboteurs, they did not manage to report to the airfield in time. As a result, sixteen of our aircraft were destroyed on the ground. Despite this, the Japanese no longer controlled the air, the constant bombing of ground troops ceased, and air battles until the beginning of August took place with varying degrees of success.

According to the Japanese military leaders, the second stage of this incident was to begin with a rapid attack by a strike group on the western bank of Khalkhin Gol in the rear of the Soviet-Mongolian troops. Its goal was to cut off the retreat routes for our wars from the eastern bank and at the same time prevent the approach of reserves. The pinning group, which included, in addition to infantry and cavalry, two tank regiments, was supposed to engage the Russians on the eastern bank of the river and prevent their breakthrough.

The offensive began on the night of July 2. Light Japanese tanks attacked Lieutenant Aleshkin's battery three times, but were unable to inflict significant damage. The next day, the first battle took place between our and Japanese tank crews. Having numerical superiority, the Japanese were unable to move forward a single step. Having knocked out three tanks, they lost seven and retreated. The reconnaissance battalion of the ninth motorized armored brigade inflicted even more significant losses on the enemy. Having taken cover, the BA-10 armored cars shot down nine tanks of the advancing enemy detachment with impunity. On July 3, the Japanese lost 44 tanks out of 73 on the eastern bank.

The strike group advanced much more successfully. Quickly crossing the river on the morning of the 3rd, she defeated the 15th Mongol Cavalry Regiment and headed south directly to the rear of the main forces of the Soviet troops defending the eastern bank. The following were advanced to meet the enemy: a detachment of Mongolian cavalry, the 24th motorized rifle regiment and the 11th tank brigade. However, the cavalry on the march was scattered by enemy aircraft, and the motorized riflemen got lost and reached their designated positions an hour and a half late. As a result, at noon, without conducting reconnaissance and without infantry support, the Japanese were counterattacked on the move by the 11th Tank Brigade alone. Having broken through the Japanese defenses, she suffered terrible losses. More than half of the tanks were disabled or destroyed. At 15:00 in the afternoon, the armored battalion of the seventh motorized armored brigade went straight from the march to battle. Having lost 33 out of 50 armored vehicles, he retreated. Interaction between the Soviet reserves was established only in the evening. By this time, all units had already suffered heavy losses during single uncoordinated attacks. Before darkness fell, another attack was carried out with joint forces, but the Japanese, pressed against the river, managed to dig in on Mount Bain-Tsagan within a day. Their layered defense repelled all attacks.

From the memoirs of sniper Mikhail Popov: “Preparing for war in the steppe, the Japanese painted all military equipment, vehicles, all support equipment down to the last telephone cable sandy yellow. Cotton covers were put on the helmets to protect them from the glare of the sun. The Japanese paid the closest attention to such details, which could not be said about us. Soviet commanders stood out by wearing field bags or tablets, binoculars, and gas masks. They wore caps with shiny stars, while the fighters wore caps. This was one of the main reasons for the large losses of our command personnel.”

The next day, the Japanese leadership seriously miscalculated. It decided to withdraw its troops back across the river, but there was only one single pontoon bridge nearby, created for the attack. Whole crowds of Japanese soldiers and officers died on it from the fire of our aviation and artillery. A huge amount of equipment and equipment remained abandoned on Mount Bain-Tsagan. When, without waiting for the final withdrawal of their troops, Japanese sappers blew up the bridge, thousands of Japanese began to jump into the water in panic, trying to swim to get there. Many of them drowned.

After this, the Japanese had no choice but to try to take revenge on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol. Starting from July 7, the enemy continuously attacked our units. The battles took place with varying success, until finally, on the night of the 12th, taking advantage of our mistake, the Japanese were unable to break through to the crossing, taking it under machine-gun fire. However, already in the morning, Soviet troops surrounded the enemy units and, after a short fierce battle, destroyed them. After this, a temporary lull reigned on the eastern bank, which both warring sides used to build up forces, moving fresh reinforcements to the area.

At this time, our pilots felt more and more confident in the air. At the end of July, Soviet aviation took revenge for the attack in Bayin-Burdu-Nur by attacking enemy airfields in the Ukhtyn-Obo, Uzur-Nur and Jinjin-Sume areas with impunity. A huge number of Japanese aircraft were destroyed on the ground, trying to take off or while landing. And in early August, several outstanding Japanese aces were killed in a series of air battles. Taking this into account, as well as the twofold numerical superiority of Soviet aircraft in the combat area, one could talk about air supremacy of domestic aviation.

By mid-August, our command had developed an operation plan to defeat the Japanese. According to it, three groups were created - Central, Southern and Northern. The central group should have engaged the enemy along the entire front, pinning him down to the entire depth. The Southern and Northern groups were supposed to break through the defenses on the flanks and encircle all enemy forces located between the border and the Khalkhin Gol River. Large reserves were also prepared in case of assistance to the Southern or Northern group. A thorough reconnaissance of the Japanese front line was carried out with aerial reconnaissance, capture of “tongues” and photographing of the area. Much attention was paid to disinformation of the enemy. Leaflets were sent to the troops on how to behave in defense. There were false reports about the erected defensive structures. A powerful sound broadcasting station created the impression of defensive work, simulating the driving of stakes. Troop movements took place at night, and vehicles with mufflers removed drove along the front. All this turned out to be very effective, allowing us to take the enemy by surprise.

On August 20, at dawn, Soviet aviation consisting of 150 bombers, with cover of 144 fighters, targeted the enemy defenses before the artillery preparation, which lasted 2 hours 50 minutes. Fifteen minutes before the end the air raid was repeated. The offensive of Soviet troops along the entire front began at 9 am. During the day of continuous fighting, the Central and Southern groups completed their tasks. The northern group flew to a height called “Finger”, at which the Japanese created a powerful defensive point, underestimated by our command. Desperately resisting, the Japanese managed to hold out at altitude for four days.

Our fighters safely covered the bombers, while simultaneously storming Japanese airfields in order to force the enemy to remove their aircraft away from the front. Having failed to suppress Russian aircraft, Japanese pilots attempted to bomb the advancing ground forces, but the strike groups were intercepted by Soviet fighters. Then, on August 21, the Japanese tried to attack our airfields, but even here they were unsuccessful; all the planes were spotted on approach. The losses of the Land of the Rising Sun's aviation were enormous; all available reserves were brought into battle, including outdated biplanes.

On August 21, the Southern Group completed its task, cutting off the retreat to the east by the Japanese-Manchurian units located south of the small Khaylastyn-Gol River. In the northern direction, our troops, having bypassed the “Finger” height, threatened to close the ring. On August 22, the forces of the Southern Group defeated the Japanese reserves that appeared, and by the evening of August 23, the encirclement of the enemy group was completed. On August 24 and 25, the Japanese tried to break through the ring from the outside, but were repulsed. The surrounded units also escaped from the “cauldron”, coming under heavy fire from Soviet artillery. The liquidation of small groups and individuals dragged on until August 31. The Japanese, holed up in dugouts and “fox holes,” fought to the last man. On September 1, 1939, the territory of Mongolia was cleared of invaders.

From the story of Vasily Rudnev, commander of the BT-5 tank: “We were not afraid of Japanese tanks. Ha-go's lungs were real coffins. Our “forty-five” punched through them. The samurai's 37-mm anti-tank guns were characterized by low armor-piercing projectile efficiency. Often our T-26s and BTs returned from battle with holes, but without crew losses and under their own power. The Japanese also dug cracks and waited for tanks in them, throwing Molotov cocktails. We sent forward a T-26 with a homemade flamethrower, which burned out the samurai. There were also suicide bombers with mines on bamboo poles. We suffered especially heavy losses from them. Only the chessboard battle formation during the attack and interaction with the infantry made it possible to reduce losses from “bottle makers” and miners.”

At the border, clashes with the Japanese lasted another half month. In addition to daily skirmishes, on September 4, 8 and 13 the Japanese unsuccessfully attacked our positions. Soviet pilots patrolling the border constantly engaged in battles with the enemy. Only on September 15 was a ceasefire signed; on the 23rd, Soviet troops allowed Japanese funeral teams to arrive on the battlefield. Removing the corpses took a whole week. The Japanese positions were covered in black smoke - the “samurai” set fire to the remains of fallen soldiers, and sent the ashes to their relatives in Japan.

Soviet and Japanese officers at ceasefire negotiations at Khalkhin Gol

The Soviet side announced that the Japanese lost about 22 thousand people killed and 35 thousand wounded as a result of the military conflict. The enemy calls much more modest numbers - 8.5 thousand killed and 9 thousand wounded. However, these values ​​raise serious doubts about their truth. Soviet troops lost about eight thousand people killed and sixteen thousand wounded during the military conflict. Also, the losses of the Soviet troops turned out to be very high in armored vehicles (133 armored vehicles and 253 tanks), since it was the tank units that had to bear the brunt of the fighting. This is confirmed by the large number of tankers who were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union during the battles at Khalkhin Gol.

The Japanese side gives completely different data on the losses of our troops. Moreover, they lie completely shamelessly; the figures cannot even be called fantastic. For example, according to them, 1,370 Soviet aircraft were destroyed at Khalkhin Gol, which is twice the number of aircraft we had there.

The reconnaissance platoon commander Nikolai Bogdanov wrote in his memoirs: “It was an excellent lesson for the samurai. And they learned it. When the Krauts stood near Moscow, Japan never dared to move to the aid of its ally. Obviously, the memories of the defeat were fresh.”

Japanese soldiers pose with trophies captured in the battles at Khalkhin Gol. One of the Japanese is holding a Soviet 7.62-mm tank machine gun of the Degtyarev system, model 1929, DT-29 (Degtyarev tank). Trophies could have been captured from both Soviet troops and the troops of the Mongolian People's Republic

Japanese Nakajima Ki-27 fighters (type 97 army fighter) at the airfield near the village of Nomonhan during the fighting on the Khalkhin Gol River. The fighters in the photograph belong to the 24th Sentai (Regiment) of the 1st or 3rd Chutai (Squadron). There are two options for where the photo was taken. This is either the Ganchzhur airfield, 40 km from the Khalkhin Gol River, or the Alai airfield, 8 km north of Lake Uzur-Nur

Japanese pilots of the 24th Sentai at the airfield starter during the fighting at Khalkhin Gol

The headquarters tent of the forward command post of the Air Force of the 1st Army Group of the Red Army on Mount Khamar-Daba. The photo shows a group of Soviet aviators in a yurt near a brightly lit table with field telephones. Some of the military personnel are in flight uniform. Household items are visible on the table; above the table there is an electric lamp without a lampshade.

A group of Soviet pilots in flight uniform (leather raglans, helmets and goggles) against the backdrop of an I-16 fighter aircraft standing in the steppe. From left to right: lieutenants I.V. Shpakovsky, M.V. Kadnikov, A.P. Pavlenko, captain I.F. Podgorny, lieutenants L.F. Lychev, P.I. Spirin. Airfield near the Khalkhin Gol River

A Soviet officer and soldiers inspect the remains of a Japanese aircraft during the fighting at Khalkhin Gol

Soviet soldiers examine abandoned Japanese equipment after the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River. In the foreground is a Type 95 "Ha-Go" light tank armed with a 37 mm Type 94 gun, the exhaust system of a 120 hp Mitsubishi NVD 6120 diesel engine is visible. On the left, a soldier inspects the 75 mm gun, the "improved Type 38", the main field weapon Kwantung Army in the battles at Khalkhin Gol. Despite the archaic design, this weapon, due to its light weight, lasted in the army until the end of the war.

Mongolian cavalrymen during the battles at Khalkhin Gol. In addition to the warring Soviet and Japanese sides, Mongolian troops from the pro-Soviet Mongolian People's Republic and the pro-Japanese state of Manchukuo took part in the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River from May 11 to September 16, 1939

Japanese who were captured by the Soviets during the battles at Khalkhin Gol. The Soviet commander in the foreground has the military rank of major. Soviet military personnel wore cotton Panama hats for hot areas, which have survived to this day with minimal changes. Red stars with a diameter of 7.5 cm are sewn onto the front of the Panama hats; enamel stars are attached in the center

Soviet mortarmen at an 82-mm battalion mortar during shelling of Japanese positions of the 6th (Kwantung) Army

In the summer of 1939, Soviet and Japanese troops converged on the Khalkhin Gol River on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). The battlefield was the endless steppe; near the riverbed itself, small sandy hills alternated with deep basins. With the help of Soviet and Japanese documents, we will try to figure out how the fighting at Khalkhin Gol was organized, and how the opponents - the armies of the USSR and the Japanese Empire - assessed each other.

Start

The first battles were characterized by extreme confusion. For several days, reports of clashes on the border did not even reach Moscow. When it became known about Japanese provocations on the borders of the Mongolian People's Republic, the command of the Red Army had to hastily search the maps for the battle area and try to understand what the Japanese wanted to achieve in the bare steppe, which had almost no water. For the Red Army, Khalkhin Gol became the first major battle after the end of the civil and Soviet-Polish wars, in which literally everything was tested in battle: from medical services and supply organization to infantry tactics.

At the end of May, after a series of skirmishes, Soviet and Japanese troops left the right bank of Khalkhin Gol. On the left, western bank of the river, the flywheel of war was only gaining momentum. Tank and aviation units were transferred from the USSR to Mongolia thousands of kilometers away.

The summer battles were characterized by extreme tension - no one wanted to give in. Soviet troops managed to hold back the Japanese offensive in July at Mount Bain-Tsagan and push the enemy back to the eastern bank of the river. By August 20, the time of the start of the decisive offensive, Soviet troops brought 574 guns to the battlefield - against 348 in July.

Invisible Enemy

The enemy did not sit idly by. The Japanese defense was built on individual resistance nodes and consisted of several lines of trenches. Separate trenches were equipped for snipers and tank fighters, who used bottles of gasoline and mines on poles. Each node was adapted for long-term all-round defense and had fire communications with its neighbors. Soviet reports after the battles noted that “even with a large presence of mounds and pits, there was no dead and undefeated space in front of the front edge”.

In front of their trenches, the Japanese set up marks for shooting - turf poles, sheets of white paper, shell casings and white flags. They were used not only by artillerymen and machine gunners, but also by individual riflemen with rifles. Firing points were carefully camouflaged, and the soldiers in positions moved exclusively by crawling or crouching.

Soviet experts highly appreciated the Japanese tray-shaped shovel, as well as the presence in the troops... of scythes that easily cut off the thick Mongolian grass. This made it easier to camouflage the structures. Often, in order to mislead observers, the Japanese exhibited models of tanks and guns, and stuffed soldiers.

From left to right: Army Commander 2nd Rank Grigory Stern, Marshal of the MPR Khorlogin Choibalsan and Corps Commander Georgy Zhukov, 1939

Field fortification floors made of small concrete slabs made it possible to withstand shelling even from 152-mm shells. But the Japanese had almost no minefields, nor barbed wire. Only in front of some defense nodes were there sections of barriers 100–150 m wide. Another drawback of the Japanese defense, according to Soviet assessments, was the crowded arrangement of shelters for infantry.

The Soviet side also had weaknesses. For example, there was an acute shortage of well-trained infantry, as well as special equipment for it. Even after the first battles, excessive losses in command personnel were noted:

“The reason for the large loss of command personnel was the lack of proper camouflage (clothing uniform, walking tall) and the desire to personally destroy O.T.(firing points) enemy".

Unlike the Japanese army, in Soviet units many military personnel, and especially officers, almost universally ignored self-entrenchment and camouflage. And the units either had no camouflage equipment at all, or they did not match the color of the area.

It turned out that the Soviet small sapper shovel was not very suitable for working in sandy soil. Since in company and battalion defensive areas they did not bother with digging communication passages, they had to move from unit to unit in open areas. This also led to additional commander losses. It is significant that even at the command post of the army group near Mount Khamar-Daba, until August only corps commander Georgy Zhukov and the operations department had dugouts with light overlap. The remaining departments were located in cars near dug holes - shelters from bombing.

The leadership of the 36th Infantry Division called the Achilles heel of the Red Army the weak interaction between all branches of the military, as well as insufficient use of the terrain, unsatisfactory observation, and lack of communications equipment for the artillery. The units that were recently deployed for mobilization were especially poorly trained. The strengths were a good supply of automatic weapons and “dedication to the Socialist Motherland, to the cause of the Lenin-Stalin party”.

The Japanese noted the “intrusiveness” of the Soviet attacks, but easily guessed their preparation from the loud noise when moving. The night attacks of the Red Army took place stubbornly, but randomly, in all directions. That is why, as the Japanese believed, they ended unsuccessfully for the Red Army every time. At the same time, according to Soviet data, at night the Red Army soldiers succumbed to panic more easily: “at night we are afraid of the enemy”. More than once there are references to White Guards giving false commands at night. Perhaps it was the ease of such small victories that aroused contempt for the enemy on the part of the Japanese, for which they soon had to pay.

“The nature of the battles is a real meat grinder”

At the beginning of August, units of the Red Army at Khalkhin Gol received many instructions from the command. The soldiers needed to learn close combat and marksmanship, crawling over distances of up to 400 m, terrain orientation and self-digging. They should have had camouflage nets for their helmets and torsos: a single soldier or even a group should not have been visible from 50 m away. The soldiers should have been able to crawl close to the curtain of their artillery fire during the attack. Intelligence was instructed to cope with the recognition of enemy fire systems. At night, their troops were required to be marked with white armbands and to open fire on the enemy only at point-blank range.

On August 20, 1939, having concentrated forces and accumulated fuel and ammunition, Soviet troops suddenly went on the offensive with the aim of encircling and destroying the Japanese group. The attack was preceded by a massive artillery and air raid; 2nd Rank Army Commander Grigory Mikhailovich Stern, who led the actions of the 1st Army Group, personally observed the work of one and a half hundred SB bombers. The fighters made 5–8 sorties per day. The Japanese heavy artillery, which did not change positions during the lull, was largely disabled by the first blow. The dominance of Soviet aviation and artillery is repeatedly confirmed by Japanese sources.

The Japanese infantry resisted desperately. There were battles for every height. According to Stern, “the nature of the battles is a real meat grinder, since they do not surrender except for single individuals, as long as they only go to death”.

The Soviet troops were rescued by equipment, the infantry went on the attack with the support of tanks and armored vehicles. As noted in the documents following the battles, “each firing point delayed the attack, the attackers lay low until a tank or armored vehicle destroyed it”. The tanks broke through the Japanese defenses, moved forward, and if the infantry was delayed, they returned and destroyed the surviving enemy firing points. Chemical (that is, flamethrower) T-26 tanks proved to be indispensable in this matter. In the July battles, 13 rifle battalions accounted for 8–9 tank battalions. In August, the density of tanks reached 20 vehicles per 1 km of front or two companies of tanks per rifle regiment (not counting artillery and flamethrower tanks).

On the other hand, such a saturation of armored vehicles led to a shortage of accompanying infantry. It happened that after the defeat of another defense center, tanks without infantry went to refuel and replenish their ammunition, which was enough for only 3 - 4 hours of battle. And when the infantry marched forward, the seemingly destroyed Japanese firing points came to life again. Therefore, Stern demanded that we first crush the surrounded pockets of resistance with field guns, “forty-fives” and flamethrowers, and then launch tank and infantry units on the offensive.

Zhukov ordered that the soldiers be fed hot food and provided with hot tea no later than dawn "with biscuits and sugar". When conducting encirclement battles, he indicated: “The main means of combat are the hand grenade, point-blank fire and the bayonet.”, since the artillery could hit its own.

In August, infantry commanders often threw their last reserve - scouts - into the attack. They were sent to the most difficult points, so reconnaissance losses were very high - up to 70% of personnel. Already in the first days of the August offensive, many reconnaissance units of companies and battalions simply ceased to exist.

By the end of the fourth day of the offensive, only, according to Stern, remained on the territory of the MPR. "a group of isolated pockets of desperate and frenzied Japanese". But the surrounded enemy also had to be destroyed before fresh Japanese units arrived. Japanese prisoners often “did not know” (and in fact did not want to say) even basic things, for example, the number of their own unit. Stubborn fighting continued until August 30, and in September 1939, Soviet troops repulsed Japanese attempts to cross the border again.

Characteristic is the instruction of the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Lev Mehlis, who saw a newspaper article “The Japanese fled like frightened hares” and noted its incorrect tone:

“It is true that in terms of the tenacity and heroism of its soldiers, no other army in the world can compare with the Red Army. But one could not turn a blind eye to the fact that the illiterate, downtrodden and deceived Japanese soldier, terrorized by the officers, showed great tenacity, especially in defense: even the wounded were shot back, but did not surrender. That is why it was impossible to print this note under such a loud title. It orients incorrectly and demagnetizes the fighters. On the other hand, when talking about the successes and victories of the Red Army soldiers and units, no exaggerations should be allowed. You need to check the material carefully. We have a sufficient number of truly miraculous feats, heroic episodes, so as not to invent or exaggerate.”

Indeed, at Khalkhin Gol in 1939, the Red Army won a difficult, difficult, but deserved victory over a strong and skillful enemy.

Sources and literature:

1. RGVA, f. 32113.
2. Battles at Khalkhin Gol. M.: Voenizdat, 1940.
3. Armed conflict in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River. M.: Novalis, 2014.
4. Svoysky Yu. M. Prisoners of war of Khalkhin Gol. M.: Dmitry Pozharsky University, 2014.